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Sensor networks are rather challenging to deploy, program, and debug. Current programming lan-
guages for these platforms suffer from a significant semantic gap between their specifications and
underlying implementations. This fact precludes the development of (type-)safe applications, which
would potentially simplify the task of programming and debugging deployed networks. In this paper
we define a core calculus for programming sensor networks and propose to use it as an assembly
language for developing type-safe, high-level programming languages.
keywords: Sensor Networks, Programming Languages, Process-Calculi.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Wireless sensor networks are composed of huge numbers of small physical devices capable of sensing
the environment and connected using ad-hoc networking protocols over radio links [1]. These platforms
have several unique characteristics when compared with other ad-hoc networks. First, sensor networks
are often designed for specific applications or application domains making software re-usability and
portability an issue. Sensor devices have very limited processing power (CPU), available memory, and
battery lifetime, and are often deployed at remote locations making physical access to the devices (e.g. for
maintenance) difficult or even impossible. For these reasons, programming such large scale distributed
systems can be daunting. Programs must be lightweight, produce a small memory footprint, be power
conservative, be self-reconfigurable (i.e. may be reprogrammed dynamically without physical interven-
tion on the devices) and, we argue, be (type-)safe.
To date several programming languages and run-time systems have been proposed for wireless sensor
networks (see [10] and references therein) that address some of the above issues, but few tackle the
safety issue. Regiment [16], a strongly typed functional macroprogramming language, is the closest to
achieve this goal by providing a type-safe compiler. However, Regiment is then compiled into a low-
level token machine language that is not type-safe. This intermediate language is itself compiled into a
nesC implementation of the run-time based on the distributed token machine model, for which no safety
properties are available. In fact, in general, an underlying model with well-studied operational semantics
for sensor networks seems to be lacking. The absence of such a model reveals itself as a considerable
semantic gap between the semantics of the (sometimes high-level) programming languages and their
respective implementations.
In this paper we propose Callas, a calculus for programming sensor networks, based on the formal-
ism of process calculi [6, 15], that aims to establish a basic computational model for sensor networks.
The goal is to diminish the above mentioned semantic gap by proceeding bottom-up, using Callas as a
basic assembly language upon which high-level programming abstractions may be encoded as semantics
preserving, derived constructs. Callas is an evolution from a previous proposal [11] by the authors, which
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S ::= Sensors
0 empty network
| S |S composition





| sensor installed functions
m ::= 〈l(~v)〉 messages
R ::= P1 :: · · · :: Pn run-queue
I,O ::= m1 :: · · · :: mn message queues
M ::= Modules
{li = (~xi)Pi}i∈I module
P ::= Processes
v value
| v.l(~v) function call
| extern l(~v) external call
| timer l(~v) every v expire v timed call
| send l(~v) communication
| receive communication
| v.install v install code
| let x = P in P sequence
T ::= {(li(~vi),vi,vi,vi)}i∈I timed calls
Figure 1: The syntax of Callas.
unlike its original sibling provides: (a) decoupled semantics for in-sensor computation (associated with
the application layer) and networking (associated with the data-link and network layers); b) support for
a form of timed events; and c) event-driven semantics.
2 Overview of Callas
The syntax of Callas is provided by the grammar in Figure 1. Let ~α denote a possibly empty sequence
α1 . . .αn of elements of some syntactic category α . We let l range over a countable set of labels rep-
resenting function names, and let x range over a countable set of variables. These sets are pairwise
disjoint.
A network S is an abstraction for a network of real-world sensors connected via radio links. We write
it as a flat, unstructured collection of sensors combined using the parallel composition operator. The
empty network is represented by symbol 0. A sensor [P,R.M,T ]I,Ot,p is an abstraction for a sensor device.
It features a running process (P) and a double-ended queue of processes scheduled for execution (R). Its
memory stores both the installed code for the application (M) and a table of timers for function calls (T ).
These components represent the application layer of the protocol stack for the sensor. The interface
with the lower level networking and data-link layers is modeled using incoming (I) and outgoing (O)
queues of messages. The sensors have a measurable position (p) and their own clocks (t), and are able to
measure some physical property (e.g. temperature, humidity) by calling appropriate external functions.
The code in M consists of a set of named functions. The syntax l = (~x)P represents a function, where l is
the name, (~x) the parameters, and P the body. The I (O) queue buffers messages received from (sent to)
the network. Messages are just packaged function calls 〈l(~v)〉. Finally, T is a set that keeps information
on timers for function calls. For each timer, a tuple is maintained with the following information: the
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call to be triggered, the timer period, the time after which the timer expires and, the time of the next call.
A process P can be one of the following: (a) a value v that represents the data exchanged between
sensors. It can be a basic value (b) that can intuitively be seen as the primitive data types supported
by the sensor’s hardware or a module (M). The special value sensor represents the module that holds
the functions installed at the sensor; (b) a synchronous call v.l(~v) to a function l in a module v; (c) a
synchronous external call – extern l(~v); (d) a timer – timer l(~v) every v expire v, that calls an installed
function l(~v) periodically, controlled by a timer; (e) an asynchronous remote call – send l(~v), that adds a
message 〈l(~v)〉 to the outgoing queue (O); (f) a receptor – receive , that gets a message from the incoming
queue (I); (g) a module installation – v.install v′, that adds the set of functions in v′ to v; and, finally (h) a
let construct that allows the processing of intermediate values in computations. The latter is also useful
to derive a basic sequential composition construct (in fact, let x = P in P′ ≡ P ; P′ with x 6∈ fv(P′)). We
make frequent use of this construct to impose a more imperative style of programming. Each function in
a module has as the first parameter the variable self that is, as usual, a reference to the current module,
i.e., the one the function belongs to. Each call to a function v.l(~v) passes v as the first argument in l(~v).
In the sequel we present two small examples of programs written in Callas. Both examples have two
components: the code to be run at a base-station (sink) and the code to be run at each of the other nodes
(sensor).
Streaming data. The program that runs on the sink starts by installing, in the local memory (M),
a module with a receiver function and a gather function. The former just listens for messages from
the network on the incoming queue. The latter simply logs the arguments using a built-in external call.
Then, it starts a timer for the receiver function with a period of 5 milliseconds for 10 seconds. Finally,
the sink broadcasts a setup message with a period of 100 milliseconds and a duration of 10 seconds. The
call is placed in the outgoing queue of the sink (O). In these examples we write install as a compact
form for sensor. install .
// sink
i n s t a l l {
r e c e i v e r = ( s e l f )
r ece ive
ga the r = ( s e l f , x , y )
e x t e r n a l l o g ( x , y ) } ;
t imer r e c e i v e r ( ) every 5 exp i re 10000;
send s e tup (100 ,10000)
// sensor
i n s t a l l {
r e c e i v e r = ( s e l f )
r ece ive
s e tup = ( s e l f , x , y )
t imer sample ( ) every x exp i re y
sample = ( s e l f )
l e t x = e x t e r n a l t ime ( ) i n
l e t y = e x t e r n a l data ( ) i n
send ga the r ( x , y ) } ;
t imer r e c e i v e r ( ) every 5 exp i re 10000;
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Each sensor starts by installing a module with a receiver function, similar to that on the sink, and
setup and sample functions. Then it starts a timer on receiver and waits for incoming messages. When
a sensor receives a setup message from the network, it sets up another timer to periodically call sample
in the same module. When this function is executed the local time and the desired data are read with
external calls and a gather message is sent to the network carrying those values.
Note that the routing of messages is transparent at this level. It is controlled at the network and
data-link layers and we model this by having an extra semantic layer for the network (c.f. Figure 4). In
this example, the messages from the sink are delivered to every sensor that carries a setup function. The
information originating in the sensors, in the form of gather messages, on the other hand, is successively
relayed up to the sink (since sensors have no gather functions implemented).
The maximum value of a data attribute and the MAC address of the sensor that reads it. This
example follows much the same principles of the above, except that it is a single shot request. Instead
of computing the maximum value of the data attribute only at the sink, we optimize the program so that
each sensor has two attributes max data and max mac that keep, respectively, the maximum value for
the data that passed through the sensor, and the associated MAC address.
// sink
i n s t a l l {
r e c e i v e r = ( s e l f )
r ece ive
ga the r = ( s e l f , x , y )
e x t e r n a l l o g ( x , y ) } ;
t imer r e c e i v e r ( ) every 5 exp i re 10000;
send s e tup ( )
// sensors
i n s t a l l {
r e c e i v e r = ( s e l f )
r ece ive
s e tup = ( s e l f )
l e t x = e x t e r n a l data ( ) i n
l e t y = e x t e r n a l mac ( ) i n
s e l f . i n s t a l l { max data = ( s e l f ) x
max mac = ( s e l f ) y } ;
send ga the r ( x , y )
ga the r = ( s e l f , x , y )
l e t v a l = s e l f . max data ( ) i n
i f x > v a l then
s e l f . i n s t a l l { max data = ( s e l f ) x
max mac = ( s e l f ) y } ;
send ga the r ( x , y ) ; } ;
t imer r e c e i v e r ( ) every 5 exp i re 10000;
The program that runs on the sink is very similar to that of the previous example. After installing the
receiver and the gather functions, it starts the receiver and broadcasts a setup message to the network.
The sensors get the call from the network using their receivers and execute setup. The data and MAC
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S1 |S2 ≡ S2 |S1, S |0≡ S, S1 |(S2 |S3)≡ (S1 |S2) |S3 (S-MONOID-SENSOR)
[P,R.M,T ]I,Op,t ≡ [P,R.M,T ]
I,O
p,t {0} (S-INIT-SEND)
Figure 2: Structural congruence for sensors.
address are obtained by calling external functions and sent to the network in gather messages. Each time
such a message is relayed by a sensor on its way to the sink, the relaying sensor checks whether it is worth
to send the data forward by comparing it with the local maximum. This strategy manages to substantially
reduce the required bandwidth at the sensors closest to the sink. The sink implementation of gather stops
the relaying and logs the data. Note that in this example, to simplify, more than one maximum value may
be recorded at the sink. Also, we use an if−then construct that is not provided in the base calculus but
that can easily be added for convenience.
Unlike the previous example, here every sensor will relay gather messages only after some internal
processing, by its own version of the homonym function.
Semantics. The calculus has two variable binders: the let and the function constructs, inducing the
usual definition for free and bound variables. The displayed occurrence of variable x is a binding with
scope P both in let x = P′ in P and in l = (. . . ,x, . . . )P. An occurrence of a variable is free if it is not in
the scope of a binding. Otherwise, the occurrence of the variable is bound. The set of free variables of a
sensor S is referred to as fv(S).
We present the reduction relation with the help of a structural congruence, as it is usual [14], given
in Figure 2. Here, S-INIT-SEND is the only non-standard rule and provides a sensor with a conceptual
membrane that engulfs neighboring sensors as they become engaged in communication. This prevents
the reception of duplicate copies of the same message from the source sensor during a transmission.
The reduction relation is inductively defined by the rules in Figures 3 and 4. Since processes evaluate
to values, we allow for reduction within the let construct and therefore present the reduction relation
using the following reduction contexts: C [[·]] ::= [ ] | let x = C [[·]] in P. The reduction in a sensor is
driven by running process P.
Within sensors reduction proceeds without obstacle while the internal clock t is not such that a timed
call must be triggered. This is controlled by the predicate noEvent that checks the time of the next
activation for every timed call against the current time. There is no special reason why the increments
in the clock are unitary. One could easily assume that each instruction consumes a different number
of processor cycles and reflect that scenario in the rules. Some rules (e.g. R-LET) simply re-structure a
process and thus we assume that no cycles are consumed.
Rule R-EXTERN calls a synchronous external function and receives a value as the result. The rules
R-INSTALL-SENSOR and R-INSTALL-MODULE handle module updates. The former takes the module with the
code installed at the sensor and updates it with the code of another module M′. The resulting new
module is installed in the sensor. The latter applies only to volatile anonymous modules and therefore
the resulting module is not installed in the sensor. The rule R-SEND (R-RECEIVE) handles the interaction
with the network by putting (getting) messages in (from) the outgoing (incoming) queue. Notice that
receiving a message is non-blocking (R-NO-MESSAGE). The rules R-CALL-SENSOR, R-CALL-MODULE and R-
NO-FUNCTION handle calls to functions in modules. R-CALL-SENSOR selects the function in the sensor’s
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noEvent(T, t)
[C [[extern l(~v)]],R.M,T ]I,Op,t → [C [[v]],R.M,T ]I,Op,t+1
(R-EXTERN)
noEvent(T, t)










































M(l) = (self~x)P noEvent(T, t)




M′(l) = (self~x)P noEvent(T, t)




l 6∈ dom(M) noEvent(T, t)
[C [[sensor .l(~v)]],R.M,T ]I,Op,t → [{},R :: C [[sensor .l(~v)]].M,T ]I,Op,t+1
(R-NO-FUNCTION)
T ′ = T unionmulti (l(~v),v, t + v′, t + v) noEvent(T, t)




t ≤ v′ T ′ = T unionmulti (l(~v),v,v′, t + v)









See Definition 1 for the formal meaning of operator +.
Figure 3: Reduction semantics for sensors.
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S → S′
S |S′′ → S′ |S′′
S1 ≡ S2 S2 → S3 S3 ≡ S4
S1 → S4
(R-NETWORK, R-CONGR)
inRange(p, p′) (I′′,O′′) = networkRoute(m, I′,O′)
[P,R.M,T ]I,m::Op,t {S}| [P′,R′ .M′,T ′]
I′,O′
p′,t ′ → [P,R.M,T ]
I,m::O




[P,R.M,T ]I,m::Op,t {S} → [P,R.M,T ]
I,O
p,t |S (R-RELEASE)
Figure 4: Reduction semantics for sensor networks.
module, gets its code and replaces the parameters with the arguments passing the sensor’s module M
as the first argument in variable self. R-CALL-MODULE is similar to R-CALL-SENSOR but uses module M′
instead of the sensor’s module M. Rule R-NO-FUNCTION handles the case of a call to a function that is not
yet installed. The call is deferred to the end of the run-queue. The idea is that the module containing
the function may not have arrived at the sensor to be installed and so we postpone the execution of the
function.
When a value of t is reached such that it implies the triggering of a call, the rules R-TRIGGER and
R-EXPIRE come into action. Rule R-TRIGGER places a timed function call l(~v) at the front of the run-
queue. The execution of the call is delegated to rule R-CALL-SENSOR. Note that only calls to functions
installed in the sensor (in M) are allowed. Other calls are deferred to the end of the run-queue by the rule
R-NO-FUNCTION. If the timer has expired, rule R-EXPIRE removes the corresponding tuple from T .
Network level reduction proceeds concurrently with in-sensor processing. It handles the distribution
of messages placed by the sensors in their outgoing queues. A message broadcast starts with the creation
of an empty membrane for the broadcasting sensor (rule S-INIT-SEND from the structural congruence).
Then, each time a new sensor is added to the membrane of a broadcasting sensor (rule R-BROADCAST), a
function networkRoute decides where the message in the O queue of the broadcasting sensor should be
copied into the new sensor. The function can be thought off as implementing the routing protocol for the
sensor network. The message broadcast ends with the destruction of the membrane, the captive sensors
becoming again free to engage in communication (rule R-RELEASE).
3 The Type System
In this section we present a simple type system for Callas, discuss run-time errors, and prove a type
safety result guaranteeing that a well-typed sensor network does not get “stuck” while computing.
Type checking. The syntax for types is depicted in Figure 5. Types τ are built from the built-in type β ,
the types for functions ~τ → τ , where~τ is the type for parameters of the function and τ is its return type,
the types for the sensor code module 〈li : ~τi → τi〉i∈I that is a record type gathering type information for
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τ ::= Types
β built-in type
| ~τ → τ recursive function type
| 〈li : ~τi → τi〉i∈I sensor code type
| {li : ~τi → τi}i∈I anonymous code type
| µα .τ recursive type
| α type variable
Figure 5: The syntax of types.
each function of the code module, the types for anonymous code modules {li : ~τi → τi}i∈I , recursive
types, and type variables. The need for distinct code module types comes from the fact that we need to
distinguish from installing code in the sensor module or in an anonymous module. The µ operator is a
binder, giving rise, in the standard way, to notions of bound and free variables and alpha-equivalence.
We do not distinguish between alpha-convertible types. Furthermore, we take an equi-recursive view of
types [19], not distinguishing between a type µα .τ and its unfolding τ [µα .τ/X ].
Definition 1. The + operator is defined (overloaded) for modules, code types, and type environment as
follows:
• {li = (~xi)Pi}i∈I +{l′j = (~x j)P′j} j∈J = {li = (~xi)Pi, l′j = (~x j)P′j}i∈(I\J), j∈J
• {li : τi}i∈I +{l′j : τ ′j} j∈J = {li : τi, l′j : τ ′j}i∈(I\J), j∈J
• Γ1 +Γ2 = (Γ1 \Γ2)∪Γ2.
The typing rules for values, processes, sensors and queues are presented in Figures 6 to 9. Type
judgments for values are of the form τS;τM ;Γ` v : τ , where τS and τM are code module types representing
the types for the built-in functions of the sensor (τS) and for functions installed in the sensor memory τM,
and Γ is a typing environment mapping variables to types. The rules are straightforward, but notice that
rule T-SENSOR assigns the sensor code type τM to sensor value.
The judgments for processes are the same as for values. Rule T-EXTERN ensures that no user-defined
function is executed as a system call and that a system call always belongs to a predefined type τs
(τS ` l : ~τ → τ). Broadcasting a call (Rule T-SEND) is only possible if the call can be made locally
(τS;τM ;Γ ` sensor .l(~v) : {}) and for functions that return the empty module, since it is an asynchronous
remote call and no value is going to be returned (cf. the return value of a system or a local call, which
is synchronous). Notice that the type system does not distinguish between local and remote functions,
however such refinement may be interesting and can easily be added. Installing code in the sensor’s
code module (Rule T-SINSTALL) implies that the module is entirely replaced and that its type is preserved.
On the other hand, installation over an anonymous module (Rule T-MINSTALL) is more flexible and only
requires that functions common to both code modules should agree on their type (vide the definition of +
operation). When calling a local function the type of the first parameter (τ1) corresponds to the type
of module containing the function being called (vide operation semantic Rules R-CALL-SENSOR and R-
CALL-MODULE in Figure 3). The rules for let and receive are straightforward. Finally, firing an event
(Rule T-TIMER) amounts to calling a user-defined function locally.
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τS;τM;Γ ` b : β τS;τM ;Γ ,x : τ ` x : τ τS;τM ;Γ ` sensor : τM (T-BUILT-IN, T-VAR, T-SENSOR)
j ∈ I
[li : ~τi → τi]i∈I ` l j : ~τ j → τ j
∀i.τS;τM;Γ ` vi : τi
τS;τM ;Γ `~v : ~τ
(T-LABEL, T-SEQ)
∀i ∈ I.τS;τM ;Γ ,si : τM′ ,~xi : ~τi ` Pi : τi τM′ = µα .{li : α~τi → τi}i∈I
τS;τM;Γ ` {li = (si,~xi)Pi}i∈I : τM′
(T-CODE)
where [li : ~τi → τi]i∈I means either a sensor or an anonymous code type.
Figure 6: Typing rules for values.
τS ` l : ~τ → τ τS;τM;Γ `~v : ~τ
τS;τM ;Γ ` extern l(~v) : τ
τS;τM ;Γ ` sensor .l(~v) : {}
τS;τM ;Γ ` send l(~v) : {}
(T-EXTERN,T-SEND)
τS;τM;Γ ` v1 : µα .〈li : α~τi → τi〉i∈I
τS;τM ;Γ ` v2 : µα .{li : α~τi → τi}i∈I
τS;τM;Γ ` v1.install v2 : {}
τS;τM;Γ ` v1 : τ1 τ1 = {li : ~τi → τi}i∈I
τS;τM ;Γ ` v2 : τ2 τ2 = {l j : ~τ j → τ j} j∈J
τS;τM;Γ ` v1.install v2 : τ1 + τ2
(T-SINSTALL, T-MINSTALL)
τS;τM;Γ ` v1 : τ1 τ1 ` l : τ1~τ → τ2 τS;τM;Γ `~v2 : ~τ
τS;τM ;Γ ` v1.l(~v2) : τ2
τS;τM;Γ ` P1 : τ1 τS;τM;Γ ,x : τ1 ` P2 : τ2
τS;τM;Γ ` let x = P1 in P2 : τ2
(T-CALL,T-LET)
τS;τM ;Γ ` receive : {}
τS;τM ;Γ ` sensor .l(~v) : {} τS;τM;Γ ` v1v2 : ββ
τS;τM;Γ ` timer l(~v) every v1 expire v2 : {}
(T-RECEIVE,T-TIMER)
Figure 7: Typing rules for processes.
Typing judgments for sensor networks are of the form τS;τM ` S. We only comment the rule for typ-
ing a sensor (Rule T-SENSOR), in particular, that the type of each function in the sensor’s code module (M)
must agree with predefined sensor’s type interface (τM), apart from the self parameter.
Typing the run-queue (Rule T-RUN-QUEUE, Figure 9), the incoming and outgoing queues, and the event
table is equivalent to typing each element of the structure individually (Rules T-COMM-QUEUE and T-EVENT-
QUEUE). Notice that each element of the incoming (outgoing) queue is typable if it can be called as a local
sensor function. The same holds for timed calls (l(~v)).
The proofs for our main results (Theorem 6, Theorem 7, and Corollary 8) are based on the following
auxiliary results. We call context process, denoted C [[P]], the processes resulting from filling its context
hole. Informally, Lemma 1 states that if a context process is well typed, then the same also holds for
the process that fills its hole, although not necessarily with an identical type. Lemma 2 states that the
typability of a context process holds and its type is preserved if we fill the context’s hole with processes
of the same type. Lemma 3 handles module’s substitution. Lemmas 4 and 5 are discussed below.
Lemma 1. If τS;τM;Γ ` C [[P]] : τ , then τS;τM;Γ′ ` P : τ ′.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the contexts’ structure and both cases are straightforward.
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τS;τM ` 0
τS;τM ; /0 ` P : τS;τM ` R τS;τM; /0 ` M : µα .{li : α~τi → τi}i∈I
∀i ∈ I.τM ` li : τM~τi → τi τS;τM; /0 ` t p : ββ
τS;τM ` T τS;τM ` I τS;τM ` O
τS;τM ` [P,R.M,T ]I,Ot,p
(T-OFF, T-SENSOR)
τS;τM ` [P,R.M,T ]I,Ot,p τS;τM ` S
τS;τM ` [P,R.M,T ]I,Op,t {S}
τS;τM ` S1 τS;τM ` S2
τS;τM ` S1 |S2
(T-BSENSOR, T-PAR)
Figure 8: Typing rules for sensor networks.
τs;τM ; /0 ` P : τs;τM ` R
τS;τM ` P :: R
τS;τM ; /0 ` sensor .l(~v) : τS;τM ` I
τS;τM ` 〈l(~v)〉 :: I
(T-RUN-QUEUE, T-COMM-QUEUE)
τS;τM ; /0 ` sensor .l(~v) : τS;τM; /0 ` v1v2v3 : β1β2β3 τS;τM ` T
τS;τM ` T unionmulti (l(~v),v1,v2,v3)
(T-EVENT-QUEUE)
Figure 9: Typing rules for queues of messages, processes, and events.
Lemma 2. If τS;τM;Γ ` C [[P]] : τ , τS;τM ;Γ′ ` P : τ ′, and τS;τM;Γ′ ` P′ : τ ′, then τS;τM;Γ ` C [[P′]] : τ .
Proof. We proceed by induction on the contexts’ structure analysing each definition case. Both cases
follow easily.
Lemma 3. If τS;τM;Γ ` M1 : τ1 and τS;τM;Γ′ ` M2 : τ2, then τS;τM;Γ+Γ′ ` M1 +M2 : τ1 + τ2.
Proof. Directly from the definition of + and using Rule T-CODE.
The Substitution Lemma is used in the proof of the Subject Reduction Theorem, to show the cases
that involve the replacement of formal by actual parameters, specifically for function call and for the let
construct. The proof is standard, so we omit it, but the interested reader may find similar proofs in the
literature, for instance in [21, Section 6.3].
Lemma 4 (Substitution Lemma). If τS;τM;Γ` v : τ ′ and τS;τM;Γ ,x : τ ′ `P : τ , then τS;τM ;Γ`P[v/x] : τ .
The following results state type invariance during reduction.
Lemma 5 (Congruence Lemma). If τS;τM ` S and S ≡ S′, then τS;τM ` S′.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation tree for S ≡ S′. The proof is straightforward.
Theorem 6 (Subject Reduction). If τS;τM ` S and S → S′, then τS;τM ` S′.
Proof. By induction on the derivation tree for S → S′. In each case, we proceed by case analysis on the
last typing rule of the inference tree for τS;τM ` S.
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[C [[v.l(~v)]],R.M,T ]I,Op,t
err
7−→ if v is not sensor, nor M′ (E-CALL)
[C [[M′.l(v1 . . .vn)]],R.M,T ]I,Op,t
err
7−→ if l 6∈ dom(M′) or
(M′(l) = (x1 . . .xm)P and
n 6= m) (E-CFUNCTION)
[C [[v.install v]],R.M,T ]I,Op,t
err
7−→ if v is not sensor, nor M′ (E-INSTALL)
S err7−→
S |S′ err7−→
S ≡ S′ S err7−→
S′ err7−→
(E-PAR, E-STR)
Figure 10: Run-time errors for sensors.
Type safety. Our claim is that well-typed sensor networks are free from run-time errors. The unary
relation S err7−→, defined as the least relation on networks closed under the rules in Figure 10, identifies
processes that would get “stuck” during computation (reduction). We write S errX7−→ for ¬(S err7−→).
Our Sensor Networks may exhibit two kinds of failures upon computing: when calling a function or
when installing a module. In the former, the call may result in a run-time error when the target of the
call is neither sensor, nor an anonymous module (Rule E-CALL); or when the function name is unknown
or there is a mismatch between the number of arguments (v1 . . .vn) and the number parameters (x1 . . .xm)
(Rule E-CFUNCTION). In the latter, an error may occur if we are installing some value that is not a module
(Rule E-INSTALL).
As an example, recall the gather function from the streaming data example that we sketched below.
{ ga the r = ( s e l f , x , y ) . . . }
The process
l e t t = extern getTime ( ) i n send ga the r ( t )
exhibits a run-time error, since function gather is being called with two arguments instead of three. In
fact, the above network may reduce using Rules R-EXTERN and R-LET, but then we cannot apply Rule
R-FUNCTION, since the substitution is not defined. Run-time error Rule E-CFUNCTION captures this kind of
failure.
The Type Safety result states that well-typed networks do not incur in run-time errors.
Theorem 7 (Type Safety). If τS;τM ` S, then S errX7−→.
Proof. We prove the contra-positive result, namely S err7−→ implies that τS;τM 6` S, proceeding by induction
on the definition of S err7−→ relation.
Finally, a well-typed network is free of flaws, at any time during reduction.
Corollary 8 (Absence of Runtime Errors). If τS;τM ` S and S →∗ S′, then S′ errX7−→.
Proof. By hypothesis τS;τM ` S, then, since types are preserved during reduction (Theorem 6), by induc-
tion on the length of →∗ we obtain τS;τM ` S′. Using the Type Safety theorem (Theorem 7) we conclude
that S′ errX7−→.
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4 Related work
The majority of available programming tools for sensor networks are based on rather low-level pro-
gramming languages, most notably the module-based idiom nesC [5], which promotes a system level
programming style on top of a small-scale operating system such as TinyOS [22]. Other examples in-
clude C and Prothothreads for Contiki [2] and at the extreme Pushpin [9].
Moving away from the hardware and system level programming we have virtual machines like
Mate´ [8] and its associated core language TinyScript that provide programmers with a suitable abstrac-
tion layer for the hardware. Middleware platforms such as Deluge [7] and Agilla [3] enable higher level
control of sensor networks for critical operations such as massive code deployment.
True high-level programming languages such as Regiment [17], Cougar [4], and TinyDB [12] ab-
stract away from the physical network by viewing sensor networks as time varying data streams or as
data repositories. Regiment, for instance, adopts a data-centric view of sensor networks and provides
the programmer with abstractions to manipulate data streams and to manage network regions. Although
Regiment is a strongly typed language — an essential characteristic to enable the scalable development
of applications — its construction is not based on a formal calculus and it is not clear that the semantics
is amenable to proving correctness results for the system and applications.
In fact, the state-of-the-art in the design of sensor network programming languages [10] follows,
invariably, a top-down approach, in which system engineers start by identifying useful patterns and
abstractions based on case studies of applications and then attempt to provide the programmer with lan-
guage constructs and system features that reflect these patterns. These building blocks must then be
compiled into nesC/TinyOS code or some other API that interacts with the low-level operating system.
The problem with such approaches is that the semantic gap between the original language specifica-
tion and the actual implementation inevitably precludes a thorough analysis of the correctness of the
envisioned sensor networking application.
Seeking a fundamentally sound path towards the development of programming languages for sensor
networks, we propose a somewhat disruptive bottom-up approach. Inspired by process calculi theory [6,
15], our basic idea is to start by constructing a fundamental programming model, which (a) captures
the specific computing and communication aspects of sensor networks and (b) enables us to reason
about their fundamental operations. This approach is justified by the fact that most high-level languages,
even those that fully abstract from the networking aspects and view sensor networks as time varying data
streams or data repositories, ultimately map their high-level constructs into a lower level communication-
centric language and run-time system.
Previous work on process calculi for wireless systems is scarce. Prasad [20] established the first
process calculus approach to modeling broadcast based systems. Later work by Ostrovsky´, Prasad, and
Taha [18] established the basis for a higher-order calculus for broadcasting systems. More recently,
Mezzetti and Sangiorgi [13] discuss the use of process calculi to model wireless systems, again focusing
on the details of the lower layers of the protocol stack (e.g. collision avoidance) and establishing an
operational semantics for the networks.
5 Conclusions
Discussion. Programming languages based on type safe specifications are fundamental for applications
where development and debugging can be complex. Sensor networks are one such case. Difficulties in
physically accessing deployed sensors, resource limitations of the devices, and dynamic ad-hoc routing
Martins, Lopes, and Barros 61
protocols, all conspire to make the programming and debugging of these infrastructures a difficult task.
In this paper we present a strongly typed calculus for programming sensor networks. Sensor network
applications are built by plugging together components called modules. Dynamic reprogramming is
supported by making modules first class entities that can be exchanged between sensors and by allowing
modules to be installed locally upon reception on a sensor. A type system provides a static verification
tool, which allows for premature detection of protocol errors in the usage of modules. This feature is of
utmost importance when programming large-scale applications for sensor networks, since it eliminates
many errors that would have to be corrected online, at run-time. We prove two fundamental properties
of the operational semantics and of the type system, namely, subject reduction and type safety. Together,
these results establish the calculus as a sound framework for developing programming languages for
sensor networks.
Future work. As part of our ongoing work, we are pursuing two different lines of research. First, we
are exploring the theoretical properties of the calculus. By applying techniques from process calculi the-
ory we hope to be able to prove fundamental properties of sensor networking applications and protocols
(e.g. protocol correctness). Second, we designed a core programming language based on the calculus
and implemented the corresponding compiler and virtual machine. We expect to prove the correctness
of the virtual machine relative to the base calculus. This will provide an unequivocal link between the
semantics of the calculus (and core language) and the semantics of higher-level programming languages
that we implement on top of it.
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